THE ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH ARMY FOR SAFETY
IN EASTERN MAŁOPOLSKA IN THE FIRST YEARS
OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC
(1921-1925)

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Abstract. Presented research is characterized by the chronological-problem approach to content. The main research problem of this article focuses on place and role and activities of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic in the process of holding the internal security in the area of Eastern Małopolska in the first half of the 1920s. The initial turning point was the signing of the Treaty of Riga in 1921 and the transition of the army to a peaceful activities, and the final one in 1925, in which an order was issued limiting the use of the army to activities that should be carried out by the State Police. During this period, soldiers from the Polish Army were used in battles with organized banditry, sabotage and subversive actions, which were repeated quite often, and which the police was not able to effectively counteract. All military actions were always carried out in close consultation with representatives of civilian field authorities on the principle of assistance. The army, however, had extensive powers with ad hoc jurisdiction, and the possibility of issuing and carrying out death sentences, also for crimes against property. The source basis of this research is the material from the archives in Poland and Ukraine, as well as literature and the local press.

Keywords: Polish Army, Eastern Małopolska, security, assistance, sabotage, diversion.

Introduction

The history of the Polish Army, the main asset of the Second Polish Republic, although it has received numerous studies, still requires research. This is due to the fact that despite many aspects of the army’s functioning, many of them still remain unexplored or, if necessary, only briefly examined. We can certainly include such matters as the actions of the Polish Army for the internal security of the reborn Polish Republic.

Essentially, the objectives of each army are associated with the tasks of defending the integrity and sovereignty of the state, which refers to actions to ensure the external security of the country. Often, however, one ignores or belittles the tasks that the army carries out for internal security, which manifests itself, among others, as a support in specific situations of bodies responsible for maintaining public order, and order during the peacetime. The Polish Army of the interwar period, due to the difficult period of the state’s reconstruction, was used in various years for numerous activities supporting this work. This was particularly visible in the South-Eastern Borderlands, where among the citizens of Polish Ukrainian nationality, numerous
movements were developed to support anti-state activities combined with the classic bandit activity, which today is referred to as terrorist. In the first years after the end of the Polish-Russian war, the area in question was also, due to the poorly protected eastern border, under surveillance by the Soviet services. It was also from their inspiration that bandit groups were created, whose task – apart from the usual banditry – was to spread anarchy and anxiety in the territory of the Republic. This was partly due to the fact that the legal status of Eastern Małopolska until the spring of 1923 was not certain in the international arena due to the lack of recognition of the Polish eastern border by the superpowers.

The main goal of the work is to show these aspects of the Polish Army’s operation, which contributed to ensuring an appropriate level of internal security of the region in the first years after the wars – world and Polish-Russian. In the first half of the 1920s, these were battles with espionage, sabotage and bandit groups, penetrating the Polish lands from the Soviet Union and counteracting the activities of Ukrainian nationalists, who in the years 1921-1923 under the so-called The first occurrence of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UMO) attacked Polish offices and Polish citizens regardless of their nationality, if they did not support their activities. In certain situations, it was also assumed to use the army during strikes or riots that could jeopardize the proper functioning of the key industries and the defense system of the economy.

The source basis of this work are documents stored in the Central Military Archive in Warsaw (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie), the State Archives of Lwów Region (Державний Архів Львівської Області), and the State Archives of Iwano-Frankiwsk Region (Державний Архів Івано-Франківської Області). An important role was also played by scientific papers, Order Diaries of the Ministry of Military Affairs and the daily press. Memories were also used, which were an important addition to the content, sometimes providing remarkable information and insights.

**Characteristics of the region**

If you want to proceed to the analysis of the subject, you should first make a terrain characteristic. Eastern Małopolska was a specific area with a non-uniform national structure, which in turn translated into an increased risk of internal security threats.

Defining the whole of the emerging area in Eastern Małopolska is not easy. This term should be understood as the south-eastern areas of the Second Republic of Poland – the provinces of Stanisławów, Tarnopol and the eastern part or the whole of the Lwów region, which depends on the criterion adopted. Taking into account the then administrative division and the terminology used, it should be assumed that Eastern Małopolska covered the entire Lwów region. In many cases, however,
the pre-existing informal Austrian division of Galicia into the eastern and western parts was already considered as the criterion during this period.\(^1\) There is also an ethnic criterion, according to which Eastern Małopolska was identified with areas of mixed ethnic structure, although in this case it is impossible to unambiguously lead a dividing line, because the Ukrainian population inhabited the foothills of the Carpathians to the vicinity of Nowy Sącz. Most often, which is obviously a big simplification, the San River was considered the line, including the areas of all counties along this river.

In order to discuss the activities of the army in favor of the internal security of the region, military criteria should be used to determine the area of Eastern Małopolska. In this case, it is feasible, because Corps District (CD) VI, which is a field authority of the army administration, its borders included the entire province of Stanisławów and Tarnopol and - in the discussed period – from the six eastern county of the Lvów region. The remaining, though administrative, ones belonged to the Lvów region, were subject to CD X, whose command was in Przemyśl. Therefore, it seems legitimate to identify the lands subordinate to the CD VI Command with Eastern Małopolska, even more so if the issues analyzed concern the army of the Second Polish Republic.

As already mentioned, Eastern Małopolska was an extremely important region on the map of the Second Republic of Poland. The eastern and southern borders of this area were at the same time state borders. Created in 1921, the district covered the area of 37.400 km\(^2\), which accounted for 9.6% of the country's area.\(^2\)

A very diverse landscape has had a major impact on the organization of human centers and the distribution of major cities and transport routes.\(^3\) The area in question was quite well urbanized in the whole country. There were 77 cities in the analyzed

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\(^1\) The demarcation of Galicia to the western and eastern parts was never formal sanctioned. At the time when these areas belonged to Austria-Hungary, it was only conventionally accepted that it coincided with the borderline between the appeal courts of the second instance in Lvów and Kraków, which ran along the western borders of the county of Jarosław, Brzozów and Sanok. (Vide: Reichsgesetzblatt vom 24. April 1854, Nr. 111). It is worth noting that in the second half of the 19th century, the Austrian authorities adapted to this division the scope of activities of bar associations, notarial, medical, pharmaceutical, commercial and industrial chambers. It caused the consolidation of this informal division of Galicia in human consciousness. However, this does not change the fact that it was an artificial division – deprived of any historical conditions. Szerzej: G. Hryciuk, Przemiany narodowościowe i ludnościowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w latach 1931-1948, Toruń 2005, p. 25-27.

\(^2\) Rocznik Statystyki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (farther on: RSRP) 1924, p. 10-11.

area. The largest of them, numbering in 1921, more than 20,000 residents, however, we can only include five – Lvów (219,400 inhabitants), Stanisławów (44,500 inhabitants), Tarnopol (31,000 inhabitants), Kołomyja (41,100 inhabitants) and Stryj (27,400 inhabitants). It also had a dense network of railways, roads and bridges.

In the autumn of 1921, this area was inhabited by nearly 3.5 million inhabitants. In terms of nationality, Poles constituted 36.8% of the population at that time, Ukrainians around 55.4%, and Jews 7%. The group of other minorities formed, among others, Germany and Czechs. The situation in which national minorities were de facto the majority of the inhabitants of the region was not beneficial in the context of security.

In the area of OK VI there was always a fairly large number of troops. In 1921, nine infantry regiments (IR) were permanently placed here: 19th, 26th, 40th, 48th, 49th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd and 54th, three field artillery regiments (FAR): 5th, 11th and 12th, three lancers regiments (LR): 6th, 9th and 14th, 6th Horse Artillery Battalion (HAB), as well as directly subordinated to the commander of the district – 6th Mounted Rifle Regiment and 6th Heavy Artillery Regiment. In Lvów, there were also units supporting various services: 6th Military Police, 6th Transportation Battalion, 6th Rolling Stock Squadron and 6th Medical Battalion. In 1924, the 22nd CR moved to CD VI and 13th HAB was formed, while in 1925, the 6th Aircraft Regiment was created in Lvów. All of them were located in various garrison cities from Eastern Małopolska, although the largest garrisons were Lvów, Stanisławów, Tarnopol and Stryj.

In Lvów, as the headquarters of the OK command, a number of institutions and auxiliary services were also deployed. These include the Military District Court, Military District Prosecutor’s Office, Military District Hospital, Army Inspectorate No. V, depots, workshops and other minor objects. In individual garrisons of CD VI there were staff and commandments of the 5th, 11th and 12th Infantry Divisions (ID), as well as the Kresowa and Podolska Cavalry Brigades as well as Military District Courts, Sickness Chambers, areas of individual services, bakeries, workshops, etc.

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4 Together with the village of Kninin, counting in 1921, 16,500 a flat, annexed to the city of Stanisławów in 1925. Vide: Dziennik Ustaw RP 1924, nr 102, poz. 937.
6 For example, in the Lvów, Stanisławów and Tarnopol provinces, in 1924, there were almost 11,500 in total km of hard surface roads for a total amount in Poland of less than 50,000 km. In all Eastern voivodeships (Lvów, Stanisławów, Tarnopol, Vilnius, Nowogródek, Polesie and Volhynia), this coefficient amounted to less than 15,000 in total km. Vide: Rocznik Ziemi Wschodnich i kalendarz na rok 1937, ed. L. Grodzicki, Warszawa 1936, p. 11.
7 RSRP 1924, s. 16-17; A.A. Ostanek, VI Lwowski Okręg Korpusu…, p. 71, tab. 4.
At the same time, a number of state institutions had their headquarters in the area of the discussed region. In Lwów, Stanisławów and Tarnopol, province offices were located. In addition, within the limits of CD VI, there were always over 35 county together with the county chairman operating there (their number was changing). Provincial Headquarters of the State Police operated in each provincial city. County Police Headquarters were deployed at the seat of county, with some of them still dealing with matters of particular importance to the internal security of the state – Investigative Offices. In Lwów, which is the third largest city of the Polish Republic, its headquarters also had regional (overseas) districts, as well as foreign representations and many other important institutions.\footnote{M. Orłowicz, \textit{Przewodnik po Lwowie}, Lwów–Warszawa 1925, p. 1-14.} \footnote{A.A. Ostanek, \textit{Wydarzenia 1930 roku a bezpieczeństwo II Rzeczypospolitej}, Warszawa 2017, p. 37-43.} 

All the factors mentioned caused that the south-eastern areas of Poland were extremely important for the proper functioning of the state, including its defense. In the period of peace, the region played an important role in economic and cultural terms. In the event of a war with the Soviet Union, it was to become a front area, for the eventuality of the war with Germany he had – through the bordering of Romania – connect Poland with this way with allied countries, especially France.\footnote{M. Orłowicz, \textit{Przewodnik po Lwowie}, Lwów–Warszawa 1925, p. 1-14.} \footnote{A.A. Ostanek, \textit{Wydarzenia 1930 roku a bezpieczeństwo II Rzeczypospolitej}, Warszawa 2017, p. 37-43.} 

For the above reasons, it was extremely important to guarantee the maintenance of an adequate level of security in the area of Eastern Małopolska. This meant that the military in this area was to cooperate with local civil authorities and, if necessary, provide them with support in order to restore the endangered order and public order.

**The internal situation in Eastern Małopolska in the first half of the 1920s and the use of the army**

The beginning of the 1920s was the most difficult period in the history of the Second Polish Republic. Reborn after 123 years, the homeland did not have a developed own model of the functioning of the state, it was initially based on the legal systems of the partitioning powers, and its economy was three separate entities. All this did not guarantee maintaining the internal security of the state at the right level. The issue was further complicated by the large number of national minorities living in the Second Republic (about 30%). If we take into account also completely unsuccessful attempts to secure in the first years after the war the Polish-Russian borders with the USSR, it should come as no surprise that the everyday life of the Kresy Wschodnie of this period is characterized by a constant threat of bandit attacks, assassinations and organized bandits sometimes attacking entire towns. Those things that were to blame were, apart from those mentioned above, also the weak structures of the police created all the time, staff shortages or the lack
of separate services responsible for guarding the borders. All this meant that the 
troops from the CD VI area in 1922-1925 were used to maintain public order and 
secure election campaigns and conscripts.\(^{11}\)

The use of the army in emergency situations was already legally regulated in 
1919 by the decree of the Head of State and the executive regulation of the Council 
of Ministers. At that time, it was assumed that it would be a solution only for the 
duration of the war. Post-war reality has shown that it was necessary to apply the 
above provisions also in a later period.\(^{12}\)

In the case of Eastern Małopolska, in order to allow the use of the army to 
maintain and secure order in the period immediately after the end of hostilities, the 
head of the Army Inspectorate No. 5 in Lwów, general Stanisław Haller was granted 
special powers in the use of the army in emergency situations in the provinces of 
Stanisławów, Tarnopol and Volhyn.\(^{13}\)

The basis for the cooperation of the army with civil authorities in the face of 
riots, strikes, the spread of banditry or the occurrence of other symptoms of public 
disorder was assisting, usually at the request of the county chairman to assist the 
officers of local police – mainly police. Independent military actions were allowed, 
however, if the situation required immediate action. In order to better coordinate 
activities, the CD VI area in October 1922 was divided into three areas of security 
subordinate to individual infantry divisions stationed in the area of Eastern Małopolska.\(^{14}\)

As mentioned earlier, in 1921, the UMO initiated a series of anti-state 
appearances. They lasted until 1923, the largest of which dates back to summer and 
autumn of 1922. In connection with the above, the moods prevailing among national

\(^{11}\) A.A. Ostanek, VI Lwowski Okręg Korpusu..., p. 165-171; L. Wyszczelski, Od demobilizacji do 

\(^{12}\) Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie (farther on: CAW), sygn. L 320.60.58. Instrukcja 
dla wojska w postępowaniu z bandytami i osobnikami strzelającymi do wojska z 31 X 1922 r.; CAW, 
sygn. L 371.6/A.120. Okólnik MSWewn. nr 7 z 28 VI 1921 r.

\(^{13}\) T. Kośmider, Toruński Inspektorat Armii w systemie obronnym państwa polskiego w latach 1921-
1939, Warszawa 2009, s. 112; L. Wyszczelski, Od demobilizacji..., p. 426, 428.

\(^{14}\) CAW, sygn. L 371.6.19. Podział OK VI na rejon bezpieczeństwa z 22 X 1922 r. Security district 5th 
ID occupied counties: Lwów, Bóbrka, Rawa Ruska, Kamionka Strumiłowa, Przemyślany, Radziechów, 
Sokal i Żółkiew; security district 11th ID occupied counties: Stanisławów, Bohorodczany, 
Dolina, Horodenka, Kalusz, Kolomyja, Kosów, Nadwóra, Peczeniżyn, Rohatyn, Śniatyn, Tłumacz i 
Żydaczów, while security district 12th ID occupied counties: Tarnopol, Brody, Brzeźany, 
Borzsczów, Buszacz, Czortków, Husiatyn, Podhajce, Trembowla, Skala, Żaleszczyki, Zbaraż, 
Zborów oraz Złoczów. In March 1923, there were slight changes in the demarcation of security 
areas to improve cooperation between infantry commanders and individual province governors. 
District 5th ID was assigned to the county of Brody (formerly the security district 12th ID), while 
the security district 12thID – county of Przemyślany (formerly the security district 5th ID) and 
Rohatyn (formerly the region of 11th ID). Vide: CAW, sygn. 320.60.58. Podział OK VI na rejon 
bezpieczeństwa z 7 III 1923 r.
minorities in Eastern Małopolska were very bad in this period. A particularly dangerous situation prevailed in the county of Stanisławów, Stryj and Kolomyja in the Stanisławów province, where almost almost every day there were assassinations, arson, looting, shooting trains or bomb attacks on military and public buildings. Not much better in the Rohatyn county, where from the moment the first squadron of 6th LR was moved from the city on May 22, 1922 to permanent lodgings to the Stanisławów garrison, the security situation deteriorated considerably, and the bandit raids increased to such an extent that the local authorities they appealed to the military authorities to relocation the army in the city. The above example shows how the presence of soldiers in the individual county had a significant impact on safety.

All this led to the necessity to strengthen the military staff of the entire area of the security of the 11th ID during the November elections in 1922. The main meals consisted of one battalion of the 58th IR and two battalions of the 29th and 60th IR. In addition, in Stanisławów there was an armored train “Danuta”, a column of armored cars and a Military Police “Poznan”, and the commander of the Stanisławów garrison was to form two groups of chase for 40 soldiers in the 6th LR (one of the groups was to be permanently alerted), while in 11th FAR a group of 20 soldiers with an energetic officer. The commanders of all garrisons were obliged to create volatile units in the strength of 44 soldiers, additionally armed with two heavy machine guns. At the same time, the Inspector of Army No. 5, in line with the powers of attorney received, abolished the regulations of the Council of Ministers making the use of army and weapons dependent on the civil authorities being summoned. It was not much better in the Tarnopol province. In the autumn of 1922, the 40th IR was the strengthening of local branches. Each battalion was barraged in the border area for one year – the 1st battalion in Kopyczyńce, the 2nd battalion in Borszczów, and the 3rd battalion in Trembowla. The remaining units from the Lwów garrison also operated in the field to a varying extent.

The general internal situation was so bad that on October 24, 1922, in connection with numerous political arrests, garrison commanders were ordered to

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15 „Kurjer Stanisławowski” 1922, nr 105 z 15 IX, p. 2; „Kurjer Stanisławowski” 1922, nr 109 z 20 IX, p. 3; I. Kulińska, Działalność terrorystyczna i sabotażowa nacjonalistycznych organizacji ukraińskich w Polsce w latach 1922-1939, Kraków 2009, p. 161-181.

16 Державний Архів Івано-Франківської Області (farther on: DAIFO), фонд (farther on: f.) 2, опис (farther on: op.) 1, справа [farther on: spr.] 114. Raport Komendanta Powiatowego PP w Rohatynie z 18 VI 1922 r. do Starostwa Powiatowego w Rohatynie; Pismo Starostwa Powiatowego w Rohatynie do Urzędu Wojewódzkiego w Stanisławowie z 17 VI 1922 r.; Pismo Starostwa Powiatowego w Rohatynie do Urzędu Wojewódzkiego w Stanisławowie z 24 VII 1922 r.

17 CAW, sygn. 313.12.28. Instrukcja działania na czas wyborów z 22 X 1922 r.; CAW, sygn. 1.320.60.58. Zarządzenie pogotowia alarmowego z 31 X 1922 r.

18 J.S. Wojciechowski, 40 pułk piechoty, Pruszków 2007, p. 10.
provide additional assistance to peripheral prisons by adding a military guard to police authorities.\textsuperscript{19}

Order No. 1 of the command of the security district of the 12\textsuperscript{th} ID clearly defines the tasks posed to the army: \textit{The task of the army is to keep the country in peace and security.}\textsuperscript{20} As you can see, soldiers were given a wide range of competences typical of police authorities. The scope of activities was of course regulated by the relevant instructions. Interesting are the guidelines regarding combating the manifestations of banditry, contained in the Military Guidelines for the treatment of bandits and individuals firing at the army and the Instruction for the army to combat banditry, issued in October and December 1922. In their light, the commander of the assistant branch in dangerous cases for public peace, he was obliged to take up his own initiative without being summoned by the civil authorities and using all his weapons. In relation to foreign bands (from the USSR), immediate execution of captured group members was ordered with the emphasis that they should not be handed over to civilian courts. Only bandits – Polish citizens were to be handed over to the courts. Villages occupied by criminal groups were ordered to be treated as towns occupied by the enemy. Liquidation of criminal groups on the borderland of counties was to take place through cooperation and constant communication of neighboring garrisons.\textsuperscript{21}

The above documents and their firmness indicate how strong was the determination of state authorities to control the situation and to bring about public order. Great importance was also attached to combating the effects of strikes and boycotts of calls for review in conscripts, although, of course, the powers of assistants in these cases were not so wide. In the event of strikes, it was foreseen that the military would only provide assistance in cooperation with and at the explicit request of the administrative authorities. Key enterprises include railways, power plants, waterworks, refineries, bakeries, slaughterhouses, saltworks and the like, of strategic importance for ensuring adequate living conditions for the population.\textsuperscript{22}

Assistance of army units during the work of the conscripts commissions, which from 1923 also called the Ukrainians, were also regulated by means of appropriate guidelines. Due to the great reluctance of Ukrainians in relation to the Polish state, the appearance of conscripts of this nationality, especially in the first years, was a big problem, so the assistance of the army to break the resistance was envisaged. According to the guidelines for providing assistance during control meetings, the

\textsuperscript{19} CAW, sygn. 313.11.28. Wytyczne pomocy wojskowej w ochronie więzień z 24 X 1922 r.

\textsuperscript{20} CAW, sygn. 313.12.1. Rozkaz operacyjny nr 1 dowództwa rejonu bezpieczeństwa 12. DP z 28 X 1923 r.

\textsuperscript{21} CAW, sygn. 313.11.28. Instrukcja dla wojska o zwalczaniu bandytyzmu z XII 1922 r.; Instrukcja dla wojska w postępowaniu z bandytami i osobnikami strzelającymi do wojska z 31 X 1922 r.

\textsuperscript{22} CAW, sygn. 1.371.6.19. Instrukcja na wypadek strajku kolejowego z 5 VI 1923 r.; CAW, sygn. 1.320.60.58. Zarządzenie przeciwstrajkowe z 18 I 1923 r.
resistance of entire municipalities should have been broken immediately by the army's quartering of the army the following day, but at the explicit request of the county chairman. The issues of individual cases of evasion were recommended to the police authorities, unless the county chairman requested the addition of soldiers to police patrol. During the commission's work, demonstration marches by villages were allowed, whose inhabitants were suspected of wanting to avoid appearance. Of course, and in this case it could not be an independent decision of the branch commander.23

The lack of complete data makes it impossible to present the whole scale of the phenomenon of assistance in the years 1922-1923. It is not known how many times, where exactly and in which army force OK VI set out for action. It is only known that the demonstration of the strength and determination of the authorities from this period gave partial results, because in relation to the next years one can notice the disappearance of disturbances inspired by Ukrainians in the Stanisławów province, but the intensification of the band's activity in the Tarnopol province is visible. The creation of the Border Protection Corps (BPC) in 1924, the supply of army inspectors with further, far-reaching authorizations and the commanding of CD II, III, VI and IX commanders to designate military units placed at the disposal of province governor and county chairman, however, confirmed further readiness of state authorities to fight for “control of the situation” in the Kresy Wschodnie.

The year 1924 was characterized by further anxieties. For example, on March 11, 1924, a bomb exploded at the Provincial Headquarters of the State Police in Lwów (Łackiego Street 1), while on the night of November 5 and 6, the Military District Court in Lwów was broken in. Such situations caused that the authorities preferred not to risk and, knowing in advance about planned rallies or other actions of Ukrainians, managed a sharp ambulance. This was the case on April 21, 1924 in Lwów, when as a result of the scheduled rally of the Ukrainians a sharp ambulance was announced along with a full officer cast for one company of the 19th IR (100 soldier) and a squadron of the 14th LR (60 soldiers). Greek Catholic religious holidays were also occasions for organizing anti-state demonstrations. On one of these “occasions” on June 15 and 16, 1924, a sharp emergency service was announced in Lwów, where one company of the 26th IR and Squadron 14th LR was prepared for action, and in Stanisławów, where one company of 48th IR and squadron 6th LR was ready.24

23 CAW, sygn. I.320.60.58, Wytyczne udzielania asystencji podczas zebrani kontrolnych z 26 III 1923 r.
24 DAIF, f. 517, op. 1, spr. 1. Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 11 III 1924 r.; Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 20 IV 1924 r.; Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 15 VI 1924 r.; Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 16 VI 1924 r.; Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 7 XI 1924 r.; „Gazeta Lwowska” 1924, nr 60 z 12 III, p. 4; „Kurjer Lwowski” 1924, nr 60 z 13 III, p. 3.
As part of almost the entire 1924, there were also specific attacks on military facilities in the area of Eastern Małopolska. In order to avoid conflicts of interest, to avoid conflicts of interest. For this reason, the army strengthened the security of small and out-of-the-way repositories. Support in these activities provided to the military will extend the duration of police structures, all recommended joint prosecution of such groups and their disarmament.25

Local conflicts on the background of nationality – apart from large cities – in most cases the police were able to solve their own problems. As mentioned, in 1924 bands gnawing mainly in the Tarnopol province became a big problem.26 Nine known cases of military assistance in the period from March to December 1924 (excluding provincial cities), only one related to the Lwów province, and two to Stanisławów province. Although these data are incomplete, they clearly indicate the main area of unrest. The degree of crime had to be quite large, as soon as in one round at Brody on November 3, 1924, which the army carried out with one squadron of the 22nd L.R and teams of the 3rd battalion of 43th IR, 21 bandits were captured. For this reason, it was also often preventive. For example, on May 14, 1924, expecting Ukrainian riots in Zablotów, at the request of the chairman of county of Śniatyn, the 49th commander sent soldiers in the strength of the battalion there.27

This situation caused that on October 6-11, 1924, the then commander of CID VI, general Malczewski, went on a detour to the border counties of the Tarnopol province in order to reconcile the whole anti-diversive action with the civil authorities.28

The already mentioned establishment of the BPC influenced the sealing of the Polish-Soviet border. As a result, the number of illegal border crossings by the gangs or agents who inspired their creation decreased. From 1925, the number of bandit activities began to decrease, which also affected the use of the army. As a result of the clear position of the then minister of military affairs, gen. Władysław Sikorski, they began to deviate from providing assistance, unless in the event of a large-scale dangerous phenomenon, which the police could not cope with.29 It is worth noting that from 1924, the costs incurred by the army due to the assistance provided were regulated by the relevant voivodship offices that asked for support.30

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25 Державний Архів Львівської Області. ф. 108, оп. 1, спр. 718. Пismo Komendanta Powiatowego PP we Lwowie do Komendantów Posternków PP na terenie powiatu lwowskiego z 15 X 1924 r.
26 „Kurjer Lwowski” 1924, nr 127 z 4 VI, p. 3.
27 DAIFO, f. 517, op. 1, sprr. 1. Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 15 V 1924 r.; Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 4 XI 1924 r.
28 DAIFO, f. 517, op. 1, sprr. 1. Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 6 X 1924 r.
30 Dziennik Rozkazów MSWojsk. 1924, nr 32 z 12 VIII, poz. 493.
This caused that during the entire 1925 in CD VI only one assistance in the round was given, directed against a band of marauding around Brody, in which 100 infantrymen and 30 cavalrymen took part.\footnote{DAIPO, f. 517, op. 1, spr. 2. Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 15 V 1925 r.}

Single acts of banditry occurred and in subsequent years, however, these were accidents of much smaller scale and range. In fact, the army ceased to be used to help law enforcement forces since 1925, and the police and civilian administration started to manage on their own. However, it should be remembered that if it were not for the use of the army, the situation in the Eastern Borderlands could pose a threat not only to the security of the region, but also to the entire state.

As mentioned, the military was also used in connection with strikes. However, large-scale protest actions did not extend to Eastern Lesser Poland, and smaller incidents were liquidated by the police. An example of the assistance provided to combat the effects of the strike was only the army’s planting of 16 May 1924, power plant, gas works, waterworks and a tram depot in Lwów. This was due to the general strike of municipal plant employees, which threatened the paralysis of the city. Four officers, 234 privates, 30 foremen and chauffeurs, and 30 cavalrymen took part in the operation.\footnote{DAIPO, f. 517, op. 1, spr. 1. Meldunek dzienny DOK VI dla 11. DP z 16 V 1924 r.; „Gazeta Lwowska” 1924, nr 114 z 17 V, p. 5.}

**Conclusions**

The first years of the independence of the Polish Republic were a period of state consolidation accompanied by a number of problems. One of them was the state of internal security, which concerned especially border regions and ethnically mixed areas. Eastern Małopolska, whose legal status was not clear until spring 1923, was just such a region. Striking banditry and anarchy could not be tolerated in the rule of law, even if it was being rebuilt after years of captivity. However, the police created from scratch were not able to ensure proper security.

For this reason, after the army moved to a peaceful footpath, it was decided that the army would take over part of the police duties and would support local self-governments and the police in their activities for security. It was agreed that the army would, at the request of civil authorities, and in specific cases through independent action, provide assistance. In connection with the above, raids and chases were organized and preventive action was taken.

The examples presented in the work clearly show that without the participation of the army, the region was threatened by anarchy. It can not be ruled out that if it were not for the Polish Army to provide order and law and to prosecute bandits in the region, the statute of the region could be different from the final, that is, the
Ambassadors’ Council would grant it to Poland. Therefore, it can be concluded that the activities of the army in favor of security in Eastern Małopolska in the post-war period contributed to the fact that the region was formally included in Poland.

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**DZIAŁALNOŚĆ WOJSKA POLSKIEGO NA RZECZ BEZPIECZEŃSTWA W MAŁOPOLSCIE Wschodniej w pierwszych latach istnienia II Rzeczypospolitej (1921-1925)**

**Abstrakt.** Pracę charakteryzuje chronologiczno-problemowe ujęcie treści. Głównym problemem badawczym pracy jest rola, jaką odegrało Wojsko Polskie w procesie utrzymywania właściwego poziomu bezpieczeństwa na obszarze Małopolski Wschodniej w I połowie lat 20. Cezurę początkową stanowi podpisanie traktatu ryskiego w 1921 r. i przejście armii na stopę pokojową, końcową zaś rok 1925, w którym wydano rozkaz ograniczający możliwości używania wojska do działań, które powinna realizować Policja Państwowa. W okresie tym żołnierzy WP wykorzystywano w walkach ze zorganizowanym bandytyzmem oraz akcjami sabotażowo-dywersyjnymi, które powtarzały się dość często, a stworzona dopiero policja nie była w stanie skutecznie ich przeciwdziałać. Całość akcji wojskowych zawsze realizowana była w ściśłym porozumieniu z przedstawicielami cywilnych władz terenowych na zasadzie udzielanej asystencji. Wojsko posiadalo jednak szerokie uprawnienia – z sądowictwem doraźnym, z możliwością wydawania i wykonywania wyroków śmierci także za przestępstwa przeciw mięśni. Podstawę źródeł nowszej pracy stanowiły materiały archiwalne zgromadzone w archiwach w Polsce i na Ukrainie oraz literatura przedmiotu i lokalna prasa.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Wojsko Polskie, Małopolska Wschodnia, bezpieczeństwo, asystencja, sabotaż, dywersja.