CIVIL TRANSPORT IN NATO

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Abstract. The current security and defence challenges require a new approach to the military logistics. To ensure collective defence of the Alliance in the 21st century, additionally to the military, a wide range of civilian capabilities and active cooperation between public and private partners, government, science and the private sector is critical. Developing further arrangements to manage efficiently civil capabilities, particularly transport ones, in time of crisis and war and reducing dependency on commercial support will improve military mobility. The article presents current security environment, analysis of NATO civil transport task, structures, procedures and processes enabling civil transport support in crisis and war, including NATO Civil War Time Agencies. This article is related to the research on “Challenges and threats of security and defence of the Republic of Poland in the twenty first century”, which is carried out by the Institute of Security and Defence Systems of the Faculty of Logistics at the Military University of Technology in Warsaw.

Keywords: NATO, Civil Emergency Planning, civil preparedness, transport, experts.

Introduction

Today, we are facing the greatest security challenges since the end of the Cold War. These includes events in Ukraine, the Russian invasion of Crimea and later eastern Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and other regions, cyber-attacks and incidents involving Soviet planes and ships. Therefore, NATO countries redefine their objectives and increase their readiness to respond to this new security and defence situation.

The current legal conditions, the availability of means and transport infrastructure, especially the long journey times in peacetime, place great constraints on the rapid transport of troops. To date, even rail transport of troops and armoured vehicles from permanent bases in Germany to Poland has taken weeks because of huge bureaucratic obstacles to the movement of forces in Europe. In the context of the mobility of allied forces, civil preparedness in the area of transport is of great importance.

1 This article reflects the personal views of the author and does not represent the views of any institution or organisation.
The article consists of four sections. The first one presents current security environment, analysis of three latest NATO Summits’ decisions regarding the reinforcement of Eastern flank countries with focus on civil preparedness and resilience. Sections two and three are dedicated to NATO’s beginnings, transport arrangements in 50s, including roles, structure and tools like civil wartime transport agencies. It analyses civil arrangements NATO developed in response to the security threats during the Cold War. Then, in section four describes civil preparedness and civil transport structures, and tools developed at NATO after 2000. It focuses on civil transport arrangements supporting operations as well as serving population needs during the time of crisis and war. Analysis indicate how these new arrangements mirror some of Cold War transport arrangements.

Closing remarks underline the role of NATO’s CEP/Civil Preparedness transport arrangements earlier and today when NATO is responding to a new type of Cold War; the importance of NATO’s transport committees. It demonstrates that civil transport support, have always been a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence, that civil transport preparedness has been an indispensable part of allied capabilities since NATO was established.

The article also informs about other areas of civil preparedness, in relation to transport; however, thorough analysis would require additional research. The analysis is based on public records, policy documents, and NATO archives online, as well as NATO’s media statements.

1. Security environment

The recent three NATO Summits in Wales, Warsaw and Brussels have defined security environment and decided on the most significant strengthening of common defence capabilities, including in the area of mobility.

The Summit in 2014 was held at a time when Russia “annexed” Crimea and continue destabilise eastern Ukraine. In the south-east, a terrorist organisation, the so-called Islamic state in Iraq and Levant, in the south, violence, insecurity, instability. The Summit took steps to counter these security threats and strengthen the Alliance’s defence capabilities, including the Alliance Readiness Action Plan (RAP)\(^3\). This represents the most significant strengthening of NATO’s collective defence since the end of the Cold War.

\(^3\) The 2014 Summit Declaration, para. 5: “In order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges, today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.”
Regarding the movement of troops and their effective integration into the local defence systems, NATO has set up eight allied force integration units in the eastern flank, in Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and in Slovakia and Hungary. These units are small, multinational headquarters to facilitate the rapid deployment of a task force with very high preparedness and allied reinforcement forces.

The NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016 was held in a situation of uncertainty and instability on the outskirts of NATO and beyond, both from the east and south; with threats from the use of troops or terrorist, cybernetic or hybrid attacks. Challenges and threats to security and defence included Russia's actions; the situation in the Middle East and North Africa; terrorism; and instability in the Middle East and North Africa contributing to the crisis associated with refugees and migrants.

NATO decided to increase its military presence in the eastern part of the alliance, with four battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland on a rotating basis. The U.S. has declared the deployment of an armoured brigade and components of the U.S. Army division, including the command that will oversee the activities of the above-mentioned battalions. At the south-east flank decided on a military presence built around the Romanian skeleton brigade within the multinational division. Importantly, along with military enforcement NATO called for improving civil preparedness.

The final declaration (§ 73) of the NATO Summit in Warsaw underlined that: “Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness. We will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means.”

As for transport this includes resilient civilian transportation systems – ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian transportation networks remain functional and effective to support civil and military requirements even when challenged or attacked; and ability to deal with large scale population movements and to be able to de-conflict such movements from potential national or Alliance military deployments, and other requirements.

The NATO summit in Brussels in 2018 was held in a situation of unpredictable and fluid security, and defence environment. Growing challenges and threats from various strategic directions, from state and non-state entities, including state-sponsored ones, or from individuals. These are conventional and hybrid wars, terrorism, mass migration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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3 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, para. 73.
These are Russia’s activities, the annexation of Crimea, the ongoing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; the deployment of modern missiles in Kaliningrad; airspace violations in NATO countries; military capability building in Crimea; large-scale exercises, including the nuclear dimension; hybrid activities, disinformation campaign and cyber-attacks. Russia has developed its military potential, activated and developed A2/AD capabilities and is applying nuclear rhetoric.

At the 2018 summit the Allies launched a NATO Readiness Initiative. They also announced further steps to improve the readiness and efficiency of air, land and sea transport, with a view to increasing mobility by 2024 at the latest. These include that border crossing times for military movements are to be shortened by the end of 2019. That, diplomatic clearances for land, sea, and air movement are to be provided within five days. Main and alternative supply routes capable of handling military transport are to be identified by the end of 2018. A network between NATO, national entities, civil and military, including the single National Points of Contact to facilitate and speed up communications and coordination regarding border crossing should be set up by the end of 2019.

As highlighted in the Brussels Summit Declaration, strategic assessments have been developed for the Baltic Sea and Black Sea, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. In the field of aviation, the initial operational capability for rapid air mobility to enable short-term cross-border air traffic in Europe has been declared.

The Allies established two new headquarters, responsible for the protection of transatlantic communication lines and for ensuring freedom of action to support the rapid movement of troops and equipment to, within and from Europe, involves specific civilian preparedness as well as joint planning.

The Alliance cooperates with the European Union in this area, stressing that the procedures concerning military mobility should apply to all NATO member states.

As part of NATO work on civilian preparedness, the NATO Transport Group and civilian experts continue to work on transport systems resilience, develop analyses and assessments of maritime, land and airborne communication lines both for strategic reinforcement and tactical movement, including kinetic, hybrid and cyber threats, preparing and assisting countries in assessing their transport preparedness.

To ensure the ability of the Allied forces to move freely and quickly by land, air or sea, requires improving the necessary legislation and procedures, to strengthen

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5 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, para. 14: “...It will ensure that more high-quality, combat-capable national forces at high readiness can be made available to NATO. From within the overall pool of forces, Allies will offer an additional 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days’ readiness or less. They will be organised and trained as elements of larger combat formations, in support of NATO's overall deterrence and defence posture. The NATO Readiness Initiative will further enhance the Alliance's rapid response capability, either for reinforcement of Allies in support of deterrence or collective defence, including for high-intensity warfighting, or for rapid military crisis intervention, if required. It will also promote the importance of effective combined arms and joint operations.”

5 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, para. 17.
command and control and to increase transport capacity. Therefore, a whole-of-government approach is necessary, including through national plans, in the framework of cooperation between civilian (administration, private sector and academia) and military actors in times of peace, crisis and conflict.

2. Transport Committees in 1950's

In 1949, the NATO Structure consisted of its Military Committee, Standing Group: Defence Committee, five Regional Planning Groups, including the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group\(^6\). It is important to note that NATO has always considered the reinforcement of Europe by forces from America. Shipping in the event of a major operation is in short supply. Today's NATO decision to establish two new NATO commands on maritime and logistics to strengthen NATO forces agility and readiness reflects a parallel thinking taking into account the importance of shipping and shipping lines.

In May 1950, in London, the North Atlantic Council set up the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) charged with the responsibility of preparing plans for the mobilisation and control of merchant shipping in time of war. The PBOS controlled two wartime agencies: the Ocean Shipping Agency and the Intra-Allied Insurance Agency.\(^7\)

The GlobalSecurity.org provided a comprehensive description of the Planning Board: “The PBOS is responsible for developing and maintaining plans for civil shipping support to the Alliance in crisis and war. PBOS planning takes into account the international character of merchant shipping and seeks to facilitate access to worldwide shipping. Its planning responsibilities include planning for the provision of shipping resources to support military lift requirements through appropriate shipping crisis management arrangements, and planning for the availability of marine war risks insurance for merchant ships supporting the alliance. PBOS plans for the use of merchant shipping in crises or wars affecting the interests of the Alliance. All other sealift activities in peace time are solely a national responsibility.”\(^8\)

In June 1952, the North Atlantic Council established the Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport (PBEIST). The PBEIST was the central coordinating body for all land transport modes (rail, road and inland waterways) in Europe during times of peace and war. It was responsible for the planning and coordination of land transport between the national authorities concerned and for the coordination of military requirements in times of war with national transport requirements and resources. Both the PBOS and PBEIST were reporting to the

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\(^6\) NATO Archives Online, D.C. 1/2 Note by the Secretary to the North Atlantic Defense Committee on Directive to the Military Committee, 25 October 1949.

\(^7\) A. Jecoch, Civil preparedness – NATO civil experts’ capability (p. 135-143), "Przegląd Nauk o Obronności", no 3, 2017.

\(^8\) GlobalSecurity.org, NATO Sealift, Nov 2011 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/nato-sealift.htm
Council, cooperated with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the governments of the Member States. In 1955, the Civil Aviation Planning Committee (CAPC) was created. Through three transport committees – ongoing shipping, European land transport and civil aviation – NATO brought all modes of transport under its control and planning process.

In 1950, NATO understood the need for preparedness for war in the civilian field, in civil defence and a key role of transport. Access to and control of shipping, civil aviation and inland transport and petroleum were crucial to implement plans, reinforcement of Europe by America, for deployment within Europe and for war time requirements.

3. Civil Transport Agencies

During the Cold War, NATO agreed the concept of NATO civil wartime agencies (NCWAs) that would be established in wartime. It was to ensure that civil resources are used in the best interests of the Alliance. Each NCWA would include representatives of each member government concerned with the activities of the agency.

By the late 1980s, the Alliance maintained plans for eight NATO civil wartime agencies, which could be stood up in times of crisis or war to coordinate and direct efforts ranging from industrial resource allocation and oil supplies to food production, civil transportation, and the management of refugee flows. This article focuses on Transport Agencies and particularly on Ocean Shipping ones.

The PBOUS planned for two War Time Agencies, for the Defence Shipping Authority (DSA) and the Interallied Insurance Organisation (IIO) and jointly with the PBEIST for the Southern Europe Transport Organisation (SETO).

The DSA was to organise and control the ongoing merchant ships. The DSA would allocate these ships to National Shipping Authorities (NSAs) as required for military and civil support of member nations. The IIO was to insure ships of the NATO pool against loss or damage due to war risks; it would cooperate closely with the DSA.

The PBEIST planned for two Agencies: the Agency for the Co-ordination of Inland Surface Transport in Central Europe (ACTICE) and the Southern Europe Transport Organisation (SETO).

The ACTICE was to coordinate the use of ports, inland surface transport facilities and resources; and SETO was responsible for the use of inland surface transport facilities and resources, including port operations, and would act as an agent of the DSA as concerns shipping in the Mediterranean.

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The CAPC planned for the NATO Civil Aviation Agency (NCAA), which provided for mutual civil aviation assistance and co-ordinated all civil aviation efforts in the common interest of the Alliance.

Other WTAs were: Central Supplies Agency, which was responsible for distribution of food and agricultural supplies and industrial products, and priority allocation systems for critical industrial production of military requirements; NATO Wartime Oil Organisation that dealt with availability and equitable distribution of crude oil and petroleum products; and NATO Refugee Agency, which was to co-ordinate the action of member countries related to uncontrolled population movements.

Shipping War Time Agencies – with the decision to plan for the two Shipping War Time Agencies all Allies agreed to provide their ocean-going ships under control by the DSA. The DSA was a shipping organisation with the function of allocating NATO merchant shipping from the pool on a worldwide basis in time of war or emergency.

There were around 4,000 ocean-going ships, at least 1,600 gross registered tons and certificated for crossing the North Atlantic. This pool of ships was augmented using ships under NATO control but registered elsewhere.

The DSA, was designed in the form of an international mutual war risks club of which the insured members were the NATO governments placing merchant ships in the DSA pool. It would ensure that the burden of war losses, including damage, to merchant ships in the DSA Pool should be equitably borne by the member governments.

The chartering of pooled ships was arranged on a government-to-government basis under the terms of NATO Time Charter Parties. The allocation of NATO merchant shipping within the Mediterranean was the responsibility of the SETO which, so far as shipping is concerned, acted as an agent of the DSA.

PBOS plans were directed to the establishment of a stable system for the conduct of shipping operations in a war of indefinite duration. However, the primary objective was to enable the DSA to immediately start on its wartime job. It was equipped with the tools needed to deal with problems as the war evolves.

A NATO insurance scheme provided war risks hull and machinery cover for ships placed at the disposal of the DSA. It was operated by the Interallied Insurance Organisation (IIO). The IIO was designed as an international mutual war risks club of which the insured members would be the NATO governments placing merchant ships in the DSA pool.

Apart from providing insurance, this agency was responsible for providing advice to the North Atlantic Council on matters relating to its area of responsibilities.

The IIO, which would come into operation upon establishment of the shipping pool of the DSA, was to ensure that the burden of war losses, including damage, to merchant ships should be equitably borne by the member governments.

It was foreseen that during a low-level crisis consultant from the shipping and marine insurance market may be called upon to provide advice to the International
Staff, NAC and to relevant NATO Committees on technical and commercial shipping matters and any abnormal demands for shipping other than Sealift.

In a higher-level crisis NATO may decide to establish crisis elements of selected NCWAs. The crisis element would also ensure that the information base for the DSA is prepared and ready for the start of operations.

The plans included that NATO might want to move reinforcements to Europe prior to the outbreak of war, if circumstances made that possible. Reinforcement movement would be initiated on short notice and would have to be completed as quickly as possible. The major task would be the deployment of US reinforcements to Europe. Therefore, some ships from the US National Defence Reserve Fleet can be activated rapidly and would be employed in the opening phases of the Reinforcement Sealift. A form of the NATO TIME Dry Cargo Charter Party has been devised to satisfy the conditions of chartering for Reinforcement Sealift before the outbreak of war.

4. Civil preparedness and civil transport after 2000

In 2000, the North Atlantic Council decided on Civil Emergency Planning’s five roles, which are: (1) Civil support for Alliance military operations under Article 5; (2) Support for non-Article 5 crisis response operations; (3) Support for national authorities in civil emergencies; (4) Support for national authorities in the protection of the population against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and (5) Cooperation with partner nations.\(^{11}\)

However, these roles continue to be valid today, along with the decisions taken at the recent NATO summits, NATO focus shifted toward enhanced civil preparedness.

After the NATO HQ Committee review, which started in 2010, CEP Structures included: Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC); and four Planning Groups covering 8 functional areas: Transport Group (TG); Joint Health, Agriculture and Food Group (JHAFG); Industrial Resources & Communications Services Group (IRCSG); and Civil Protection Group (CPG). The CEPC and Planning Group members are representatives from national ministries. The Civil Expert Pools established and maintained by each Planning Group and International Staff. In total around 400 experts from different industries, academia and in case of CPG and JHAFG also from administration. It also included such tools as the COMPASS (Comprehensive Approach Support Staff) and Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

The backbone of NATO CEP is the Planning Group’s expert pool. CEP experts play advisory and operational role at any stage of crisis management. CEP procedures and tools include CEP and Planning Group Crisis Management

Arrangements and expert request and deployment procedures. CEP Crisis Management Arrangements (CMAs) describe crisis roles for civil emergency planning actors; including civil experts who are security cleared; deployable; prepared to provide advice on short notice and with no cost. Planning Groups maintain the civil expert’s pool, consult stakeholders and address policy priorities. Civil experts advise, support and assist stakeholders, including nations on use of civil resources; on training and exercises.

Today, the NATO Transport Group operates in three different formats – Ocean Shipping (TG OS), Inland Surface Transport (TG IST) and Civil Aviation (TG CA) – as well as jointly, reports to the CEPC. Its members are coming from respective ministries in capitals and the NATO Military Authorities.

The three TG sup-groups maintain three respective expert pools with around 150 civil experts/transportation expert located in nations. Their expertise covers all civil transport aspects relevant to NATO defence, operational planning and crisis management. Civil experts support nations and NATO civil and military bodies in assessing and developing national preparedness, resilience, response and recovery capabilities, assist in preparations and participate in training and exercise activities; and high visibility events. The TG acts and makes decisions by consensus, the same principle as the Council and the CEPC.

5. Closing remarks

Civil preparedness, readiness and resilience has been at the top of NATO’s agenda since 2014. Review of the history of the Alliance shows that many of the current issues are not new. During the Cold War era it was relatively easier to plan both for military and civil preparedness because of pretty well-defined security environment.

During the Cold War, many civilian assets such as transport, ports, airports, telecommunications or airspace were in government hands. In a situation of crisis or war, there were mechanisms in place to allow the control and use of these assets by NATO allies. These mechanisms included the NATO Civilian War Times Agencies for: Shipping Management and Insurance; Land Transport Coordination; Aviation; Central Supply; Energy and Refugee Organisations. With its Civil War Time Agencies NATO was prepared to reinforce units in Europe rapidly with forces from America, to provide support to military operations and to civil population in time of crisis and war. These Agencies were put in dormant status and finally were disbanded in early 2000.

Today, the security environment has become more demanding. Russia’s annexation of the Crimean, continued activity in eastern Ukraine, cyberattacks and other forms of hybrid warfare, military activities near NATO’s borders, development of A2/AD capabilities, nuclear rhetoric, terrorism, migration, technological developments, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, challenges in middle east and other regions required NATO’s new commitments to be able to defend its territory collectively. These included developments in the area of civil preparedness.

The 2016 Summit reiterated that “Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness.”

Today, NATO is implementing an Action Plan on Preparedness, including strengthening its defence capabilities in NATO’s eastern and southern flanks. Civilian readiness is a key factor in the Alliance’s collective defence. NATO’s civil readiness concerns primarily those aspects of national planning which are the most critical to NATO’s collective defence.

In 2016, NATO agreed on the basic requirements for resilience in strategic sectors, which were translated into the seven basic resilience requirements along with a set of guidelines on minimum standards for national resilience, evaluation and a tailor-made toolkit. They aim to help countries achieve the required resilience and provide benchmarks against which to assess the state of civilian preparedness.

Resilience is not a task for the Alliance. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty says that “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Long before the advent of cyber threats and hybrid warfare, this notion of resilience was always understood to go beyond military capabilities. As early as the 1950’s, NATO had put in place policies and planning for civil preparedness.

Today, the CEPC and its Planning Groups are responsible for civil preparedness. They maintain a civilian advisory capability. Civilian experts advise NATO political and military bodies on the civilian aspects of crises and the effective use of civilian capabilities, support civil-military planning and the development of programmes and concepts. The NATO experts contribute to development of resilience.

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15 NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, para. 73: “Today we have made a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience and to maintain and further develop our individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness. We will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means. In this context, we welcome the Resilience Guidelines approved by Defence Ministers in June 2016.”

requirements, the evaluation criteria, the Guidelines, and related reports analysing
the civil preparedness.

Civil preparedness/resilience related questions based on the Guidelines were
incorporated into the NATO Defence Planning Process\textsuperscript{17}, the Defence Planning
Capability Survey (DPCS). This highlights the rising importance of concerted civil
and military planning for NATO and its members alike.

To some extend the CEP arrangements developed after 2000, including expert
pools offset the NATO Civil War Time Agencies. In a crisis these experts can advise
nations, NATO or other organisations if directed by NAC. Regarding transport they
can advise on planning, operational issues, insurance, etc. They can be instrumen-
tal in chartering transport assets. They support the military and are instrumental
in developing and guiding nations on civil preparedness and resilience.

Today, we have increased requirements for civil transport as decades ago. Al-
lled forces should be able to move into and across Europe at high speed to reinforce
a threatened Ally on the periphery of NATO territory. However, nowadays, we operate
in a global world. Most infrastructure, assets and services are privately owned.
Outsourcing of non-combatant military tasks has become the norm and as a result,
the dependence of the armed forces on the availability of civilian resources ena-
bling military mobility has increased. Therefore, with the recent events in Ukraine
and elsewhere, we must continue researching new type of conflicts and wars to be
effective and efficient in fighting them. Analysing early NATO civil preparedness
structures and arrangements might lead to reinventing some of them.

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**TRANSPORT CYWILNY W NATO**

Streszczenie. Obecne wyzwania w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i obrony wymagają nowego podejścia do logistyki wojskowej. Dla zapewnienia zbiorowej obrony Sojuszu w XXI wieku, oprócz wojskowości, kluczowe znaczenie ma szeroki zakres zdolności cywilnych i aktywna współpraca między partnerami publicznymi i prywatnymi, rządem, nauką i sektorem prywatnym. Opracowanie dalszych rozwiązań w celu skutecznego zarządzania zdolnościami cywilnymi, w szczególności transportowymi, w czasie kryzysu i wojny, oraz zmniejszenie zależności od wsparcia sektora prywatnego poprawi mobilność wojskową. W artykule przedstawiono aktualne środowisko bezpieczeństwa, analizę zadań transportu cywilnego NATO, struktur, procedur i procesów umożliwiających wsparcie transportu cywilnego w sytuacjach kryzysowych i podczas wojny, w tym natowskich cywilnych agencji na czas wojny. Artykuł jest związany z badaniem Wyzwania i zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa i obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w XXI wieku, prowadzonym przez Instytut Systemów Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Wydziału Logistyki Wojskowej Akademii Technicznej w Warszawie.

Słowa kluczowe: NATO, cywilne zarządzanie kryzysowe, cywilne przygotowania obronne, transport, eksperci.