This article deals with the issue of analyzing the security policy of Belarus in the context of the dynamics and processuality of Russia's neo-power (assertive and revisionist) campaign. The aim of the article is, taking into account the asymmetry of Russian-Belarusian relations, an attempt to explain the attempts to overcome and diversify the Belarusian status as a satellite of Moscow. These efforts will be presented against the backdrop of the main security events at the East Euro-Atlantic and West Eurasian junction - geopolitical areas that intertwine the fate and prospects of ensuring the security (survival) of Belarus, in the light of subsequent sequences of Russia's international activities. Therefore, the research strategy of this article assumes the use of systematic and at the same time reductively hierarchical ascertainment – the use of research instruments offered (apart from the critical analysis of literature) by the following methods: abstraction, induction and analogy. In the field of research problems – findings – regarding: the impact of Moscow's revisionism on the security policy of Belarus (1), the importance and specificity of Moscow's supervision over "recalcitrant" Belarus, in the context of its global Russian projection as a superpower (2), and Belarus' attitude towards Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (3) should fill the gap in building a realistic policy towards Belarus. The main research problem of this analysis comes down to the basic question: "how does Russian revisionism and assertiveness in the international arena affect the subjectivity, statehood and security policy of Belarus?". The analysis and the conclusions presented should therefore be useful for the proper reception of recent, current and potentially – upcoming activities - of Belarus in the international arena, as well as the possibility of using Belarus by Russia. The main conclusion of the study should be considered the Kremlin's still significant influence on the fate of the Belarusian statehood, conditioned by Russia's skilful maintenance of Belarus in its sphere of influence and its "power exhibition" on the geopolitical Western Front, at an important stage of reconfiguration of the global order. The article shows that as a result of Russia's "restrained domineering" towards Belarus, which is allowed "characteristic satelliteness" and "recalcitrant loyalty", a systemic consensus develops between these countries, which, while still allowing Putin to feel like an emperor, binds Belarus in a limited in the process of Russian revisionism and provides the Belarusian dictator with the resources and cover to survive. In a situation where a return to “business as usual” with the West and connecting Russia to transit connections with the West is not possible for the time being, Lukashenko is trying to implement an adversarial (albeit useful for Russia) set of opposing roles: a “reluctant co-aggressor” and a “supporter of peace” in the Ukrainian-Russian war.